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International Human Rights Law in
United States Courts: Professor
Riesenfeld's Contributions
By NAOMI ROHr-ARRIAZA::
I. Introduction
Not so long ago, the use of international human rights law to up-
hold the rights of individuals in U.S. courts was practically unthink-
able. International law concerned interrelations among sovereign
states; individuals were irrelevant, or at least largely subsumed by the
interests of their state. Moreover, with few exceptions, what hap-
pened to non-U.S. citizens abroad did not concern U.S. courts.
Although the application of international human rights law in
U.S. courts remains far from commonplace, the exclusion of individ-
ual rights from the sphere of applicability of international law is defin-
itively a relic of the past. Customary international law and, more
recently, human rights treaty law, are becoming increasingly relevant
to a broad range of civil rights, discrimination, and criminal defense
cases. The challenge now is to educate both domestic advocates and
judges as to the usefulness and applicability of an increasing body of
law, so that judges routinely consider international law-based argu-
ments with the same ease they consider constitutional or statutory
ones.
In breaking down the barriers for human rights advocates at-
tempting to bring suit in U.S. courts, Professor Stefan A. Riesenfeld
has played an important role. This Essay focuses on some of those
contributions. I consider two aspects of human rights law-the appli-
cability and proof of customary international law, and the use of reser-
vations in connection with human rights treaties. I end with a few
musings on current problems and future directions for cases raising
international human rights law in U.S. courts.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. J.D.,
M.P.P., University of California, Berkeley. The author would like to thank Yvonne Cud-
ney for her research assistance.
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II. Customary Law
Courts, advocates and scholars have identified three principal
ways of using international law in individual rights cases: through the
applicability of a treaty ratified by the United States, through the ap-
plication of customary international law as federal common law or as
the "law of nations," and as an aid to interpretation of domestic con-
stitutional or statutory law.' The use of customary international law
received a big boost in 1980, through the seminal case of Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.2 That case, brought by a Paraguayan against an ex-chief of
the Paraguayan police for the torture of a family member fn Paraguay,
required a U.S. court to decide whether official torture was a violation
of the "law of nations."3 The district court dismissed the suit in part
based on the idea that torture of a citizen by officials of his own state
could not implicate the law of nations, which concerned inter-state
relations.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It reviewed evidence including
unratified treaties, U.N. General Assembly resolutions, constitutional
provisions of other countries, affidavits of international legal scholars
and judicial decisions to find that official torture is now prohibited by
the law of nations, and thus awarded damages to plaintiffs. In so do-
ing the court applied a number of doctrines, including that of individ-
ual liability for certain heinous acts, the idea that international law,
especially customary law, is constantly changing, and that customary
international law is part of federal common law.5
The court based its argument in part on a brief amici curiae sub-
mitted jointly by the U.S. Departments of State and Justice. Professor
Riesenfeld, at the time an attorney-advisor to the State Department,
was a key supporter of the amici brief. His hand is particularly appar-
ent in the citations to a German case finding individual rights under
1. See Connie de la Vega, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15 WHIT.
TIER L. R-v. 471,474 (1994); see generally Symposium, Problems of Proving International
Human Rights Law in the U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT'L & Come. L. 225 (1995).
2. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. The case was brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994),
which gives federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations." While the statute had existed since 1789,
prior to Filartiga less than a handful of cases had attempted to use it.
4. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-C-917, Memorandum Order at 4 (E.D.N.Y., May 15,
1979).
5. Jeffrey Blum & Ralph Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L. L,J.
53 (1981).
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international law6 and in the use of cases from other national courts
employing customary law. For that reason, he is surely one of the
"parents" of the string of successful suits brought under the Alien Tort
Claims Act that came in the wake of Filartiga. These include: suits
brought on behalf of victims of torture, summary execution, and dis-
appearance in Argentina, 7 Ethiopia,s Guatemala, 9 the Philippines, 10
and Haiti;" and victims of genocide and war crimes in Bosnia-Herze-
govina.' 2 The Filartiga holding has been partially codified in the 1991
Torture Victims Protection Act. 3 Others have chronicled the benefits
and drawbacks of suits brought under these provisions,' 4 but they are
undoubtedly one of the principal arenas in which U.S. judges confront
issues of international human rights law.
III. Reservations to Treaties
For many years customary international law was the main avenue
for raising international human rights claims in U.S. courts. This was
the case largely because the United States, while active internationally
in the elaboration and promotion of human rights treaties, had ratified
practically none.' 5 The Genocide Convention, signed in 1948, was fi-
6. Matter of the Republic of the Philippines, 46 BVerfGE 342, 362 (2 BvM 1176, Dcc.
13, 1977).
7. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 19S7); modified Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
8. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
9. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995).
10. In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960, 125 L Ed. 2d 661 (1993).
11. Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
12. Kadic v. Karadi&, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d Cong., at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84,
86. The TVPA extended the Filartiga cause of action to U.S. citizens, and covers cases of
torture and summary execution.
14. See Ellen Lutz, The Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Can Justice Be Achieved in
U.S. Courts for Abuses that Occurred Abroad?, 14 B.C. THpmr \Vom. LJ. 43 (1994); Paul
Hoffman, The "Blank Stare Phenomenon". Proving Customary International Law in U.S.
Courts, 25 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 181 (1995); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien
Tort Claims Act of 1789: Lessons from In re Marcos Litigation, 67 ST. JOHN's L. RLv. 491
(1993).
15. The U.N. Charter and the 1949 Geneva Conventions were exceptions, but early on
courts rejected the applicability of the human rights provisions of the Charter. See, e.g.,
Sei-Fujii v. State of California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617, 722 (1952); Handel v. Ar-
turovich, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), butsee U.S. v. Noriega, SS F. Supp. 791 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (POW provisions of Geneva Convention Il are self-executing). Because they
apply to situations of armed conflict, the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to most
claims of human rights abuse. In addition, the United States has ratified several antislav-
ery treaties, see, eg., Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
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nally ratified forty years later by the U.S. Senate.16 A short series of
treaties followed: the Convention Against Torture,17 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,'" the Convention Against Ra-
cial Discrimination.19 A longer list awaits hearings on ratification.20
Treaties, according to the U.S. Constitution, are the law of the
land.2' A treaty prevails over inconsistent state law and over federal
statutes passed before the treaty's ratification. 22 After a treaty is ne-
gotiated and signed by the Executive, it must be ratified by two-thirds
of the Senate to become U.S. law. 3 Once ratified, the question of
whether the treaty is directly applicable as law in U.S. courts turns on
whether or not it is considered "self-executing." Professor Riesen-
feld's work on the definition and implications of self-execution, both
in a comparative context and in U.S. constitutional law, has made it
easier to argue that provisions of human rights treaties may be applied
directly by U.S. courts.
Trade, and the Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201,
266 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957), and the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for the
United States on July 7, 1976).
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, opened for signature
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); senate advice and consent,
132 CONG. Rnc. S. 1377 (1986) (entered into force for the United States Feb. 23, 1989).
Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. .L. 100-106, 102 Stat. 3045, (1988)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1091-92 (1994)).
17. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51. at 197, U.N. Doe.
A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987); senate advice and consent, 136 CoNo.
REC. S. 17491-2 (1990) (entered into force for the United States Nov. 20, 1994).
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); senate advice and consent, 138
CONG. REc. S. 4783 (1992) (entered into force for the United States Sept. 8, 1992).
19. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969);
Senate advice and consent, 140 CONG. REc. S. 7634 (1994) (entered into force for the
United States Nov. 20, 1994).
20. These include the: Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination
against Women, 7th mtg., U.N. Doc CEDAW/SP/1994/2 (1993); Convention on the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doe. A/44/736
(1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49-52, U.N. Doe. A/
6316 (1966); and the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). The current makeup of the Senate Foreign Relations committee
makes it unlikely that the ratification process will advance in the near future.
21. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
22. 1d; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118 (1933).
23. U.S. CONsTr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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The doctrine of self-executing treaties emerged in U.S. law in
1829 4 Throughout his many writings, Professor Riesenfeld has been
a champion of the idea that U.S. courts are the proper authorities to
decide the domestic effect of treaty provisions. He has also meticu-
lously and insistently used the court decisions of other countries to
illuminate treaty practice, sometimes a rare method for U.S.-based
academics. Based in part on these comparative studies, Professor Rie-
senfeld took issue with the often-used test of the "intent of the par-
ties" when applied to multilateral (as opposed to bilateral) treaties.
He found that the variety of domestic approaches to treaty implemen-
tation among states made such a test "dubious."25 Rather, he posited
that in the United States a treaty should be deemed self-executing if it
(a) involves the rights and duties of individuals; (b) does not cover a
subject for which legislative action is required by the Constitution; and
(c) does not leave discretion to the parties in the application of the
particular provision.26 This test has been widely used since Professor
Riesenfeld first posited it.27
For purposes of human rights law, if the intent of the parties is
not determinative in deciding whether a treaty provision is self-exe-
cuting, then it follows that the U.S. executive's views on the subject,
while "an element" in interpreting a given provision, cannot bind the
courts. Thus, if a provision meets the objective test for self-execution,
24. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1129). Marshall wrote:
[A treaty] is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legisla-
tive provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself
to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
Id. at 314. See also Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
25. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Erecuting Treaties and GATT: A Note.
ble German Judgment, 65 AM..J. IIN'L L. 548,550 (1971) [hereinafter Riesenfeld, A Nota-
ble German Judgment]. Elsewhere, he explains that there are at least three systems: in
some states (eg., Canada and the United Kingdom), separate parliamentary action is
needed to create rights and duties of individuals based on a treaty; in others (like the
United States) the Executive and the Senate share the treaty-making power, and under
some circumstances a treaty may create rights without further legislation, and in others, the
entire legislature must assent to the treaty, which then becomes applicable as domestic law.
See also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal:
Win at Any Price?, 74 AJ. I IN'L L. S92, S99 (1980) [hereinafter Riesenfeld, Win at Any,
Price?].
26. Riesenfeld, A Notable German Judgment, supra note 25, at 550.
27. See e.g., Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 50 (ist Cir. 1932); U.S. v.
Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 79S (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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the courts should be able to apply it in individual cases, notwithstand-
ing even a formal declaration by the Executive to the contrary.28
Both the Executive Branch and the Senate have attempted to
limit the direct applicability of ratified treaties. In ratifying the human
rights treaties, the Senate attached to each treaty a long list of reserva-
tions, declarations, understandings, and provisos, intended to remove
any potential for the treaties to affect domestic law.29 Reservations in
international law are intended to allow states to assume the bulk of
the legal obligations contained in a treaty while modifying or exclud-
ing the legal effects of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica-
tion to that state.30 Unless the treaty otherwise specifies, reservations
to treaties are generally allowed unless they are "incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty."' 31 Understandings, declarations
and provisos, on the other hand, are not intended to vary legal obliga-
tions, but to express a party's interpretation of a provision or state a
government's position on the relation of the provision to other law.32
Some of the reservations attached by the U.S. Senate arguably
violate the "object and purpose" of the treaty in their specifics, while
others do so through blanket statements intended to limit the benefits
of the treaty to those already provided in U.S. law. An example of the
former involves, for instance, application of the death penalty to a
minor who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
While Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides that "sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age," the
United States entered a reservation to this provision.33 The United
28. Riesenfeld, Win at Any Price?, supra note 25, at 900-01.
29. See generally Symposium, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169
(1993) [hereinafter Symposium]. See also William Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the U.S. Still a Party?, 21 BRooK. J.
INT'L L. 277 (1995).
30. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969. art.
2(1)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
31. Id. art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-37, 8 I.L.M. at 686-87.
32. Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, in Symposium on Parliamentary Participa-
tion in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 C .-KENr L. REv. 571, 602 (1991).
33. The U.S. reservation reads: "[T]he United States reserves the right, subject to
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a preg-
nant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of
capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below the
eighteen years of age." Senate Advise and Consent to International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, S. 4783-84, 102d Cong., Apr. 2, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 653.
[Vol. 20:601
International Human Rights Law in United States Courts
Nations Human Rights Committee, the body charged with overseeing
implementation of the Covenant, as well as a large number of states,
have objected to the reservation as contrary to the "object and pur-
pose" of the treaty.34 Moreover, both the Human Rights Committee
and the European Court of Human Rights have concluded that a res-
ervation that is invalid because it violates the object and purpose of
the treaty is severable, so that the treaty will bind the reserving party
without benefit of the reservation.3
An example of the second type of problematic reservation is the
U.S. declaration that the substantive provisions of human rights trea-
ties are "non-self-executing." Although not framed as such, the state-
ment in essence amounts to a reservation, because the self-executing
nature of treaty obligations is not a unilateral question 6 and is part of
the "essential elements of the Covenant guarantees."37 Nonetheless,
the question remains whether U.S. courts are bound by the conditions
imposed by the Senate, or rather must make their own determination
of the validity of a reservation.
In a 1991 article co-authored with Professor Frederick Abbott,
Professor Riesenfeld argued that U.S. courts must independently eval-
uate the existence and legality of reservations to treaties.-s This con-
tradicted the traditional view that because the Senate may decide
whether to ratify a treaty, it can conditionally ratify it, and that such
conditions, while perhaps both unwise and invalid as a matter of inter-
national law, have valid domestic effect.39 Instead, Riesenfeld and
34. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Swedan,
Spain, and the Netherlands have all objected to the U.S. reservation. Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as of Dec. 31, 1994, U.N. Doz. STLegf
SER.E13 at 127-29. The Human Rights Committee expressed its views in its Comment
responding to the U.S.'s first report under the Covenant. INTERN.TIONAL COvE-NANT ON
Civi. AND POLrTCAL RIGHTS, HumAN RiGmS CoNih-rrrEn, GENERA. CoM'.f NT No. 24,
CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF TiE
COVENANT, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79IAdd. 50 (1995).
35. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIvL AND POLITICAL RIGHTs, HuMAN RIGHTS
ComMITTEE, GENERAL COmNiENT No. 24 TO RESERVATIONS MADE UPON RATIFICATION
OR ACcESSION TO THE COVENANT OR THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL THERETO, OR rq RELA-
TION TO DECLARATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THm COVENANT, U.N. Doz. CCPRJWO211
Rev. I/Add. 6, para. 20 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 24]; Belilos v. S%vitzer-
land, Eur. Ct. MR. (Ser. A) 466 (19SS). See also Schabas, supra note 29, at 291.
36. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 32, at 608.
37. This was the position of the Human Rights Committee, which noted that without
applicability in domestic courts "[n]o real international rights or obligations have thus been
accepted." General Comment No. 24, supra note 35.
38. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 32, at 571.
39. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Ntaara
Power Reservation, 56 COLum. L. REV. 1151 (1956); Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the
1997]
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Abbott argued that "it is a constitutional requirement that Senate res-
ervations be a valid part of a treaty instrument under inlernational law
in order for them to have domestic legal effect."40 This is so because a
reservation invalid under international law is severed from the treaty,
so that it no longer falls within the Senate's power to ratify. Under
U.S. law, the Senate does not have the power to make law on its own,
and the Senate and President combined do not have the power to
make law other than a treaty. Thus, unless both houses of Congress
pass, and the President signs, a reservation invalid under international
law, the reservation has no domestic effect.
It remains to be seen whether U.S. courts will be receptive to this
argument. If they are, it would remove the primary obstacle to the
use of human fights treaties qua treaties in U.S. courts. While this
would not preclude continuing use of these treaties as evidence of cus-
tom (as in Filartiga) or as guides for interpretation of U.S. legal provi-
sions,4 ' it would restore treaties to their usual preeminence as an
independent source of international norms. The range of cases in
which recently-ratified human fights treaties might be applicable, and
might provide rights beyond those extant in current U.S. law, is quite
broad. In addition to the death penalty for minors example discussed
earlier,42 provisions of California's Proposition 187 (restricting access
to education and medical services for the undocumented) 43 and the
1996 federal welfare reform bill might raise treaty-based challenges."
Other possible examples include the recently-passed Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act's45 provisions limiting judicial re-
United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67
CHI-KENT L. REv. 515 (1991); Michael Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1983).
40. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 32, at 592.
41. For examples of cases using international standards to interpret U.S. laws, see
Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989); Lareau v Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177
(D. Conn. 1980); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981).
42. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The issue is raised in a case now before
the Nevada Supreme Court, Dominguez v. State, No. 26562 (on file with author), in which
a death sentence was imposed on a defendant who was 16 years old at the time he commit-
ted the crimes.
43. Anne Wagley, Newly-Ratified International Human Rights Treaties and the Fight
Against Proposition 187, 17 CHICANo-LATINO L. REv. 88 (1995).
44. See de ]a Vega, supra note 1, at 474.
45. Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). I am indebted to Dima Said for information
on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
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view46 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act's provisions for summary removal of certain legal aliens. 47
As many other authors have pointed out, these broad reserva-
tions, and especially the non-self-executing provisions, have stunted
the use of international human rights treaties, and kept U.S. courts
from playing their rightful role in the development of international
law itself.48 The inability to raise treaty-based arguments directly has
had another worrisome side effect: advocates have learned to rely too
heavily on customary law. Many arguments start from customary law,
but then use treaties as the most weighty evidence of the state practice
and opinio juris required to establish a customary law norm. This
"second-best" form of argument, driven by the inability to use treaty
law directly, distorts the proper relationship between treaties and cus-
tom.49 It also makes U.S. judges more reluctant to rely on interna-
tional human rights-based arguments. While judges can analogize
treaties to both contracts and statutes and thus have little problem
with their interpretation, ascertaining customary law is a less familiar
technique and one which may give many judges enough pause for
them to sidestep the issue. Thus, if Professor Riesenfeld and Profes-
sor Abbott's theory is successful, it will go far to restoring a balance
and promoting the use of international law in cases involving individ-
ual rights.
IV. Conclusion
These are admittedly only two of the many possible examples of
Professor Riesenfeld's contributions to an astounding array of areas of
law. But they are two, I believe, where his work will directly impact
the human rights, and thus the lives, of people for years to come.
46. Id.
47. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
48. See generally Symposium, supra note 29; Damrosch, supra note 39.
49. It also opens up a series of problems peculiar to the application of customary law,
including the requirement that there be no "controlling legislative or executive act." See
Michael Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana:" Is Violation of Customary International
Law by the Executrive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L REv. 321 (195).
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